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Chapter 2
Introduction
2.1 Abstract
Cryptosystems are one of the most important parts of secure online poker card games.
However, there is no research comparing the RSA Cryptosystem (RC) and Elga-
mal Cryptosystem (EC) for mental poker card games. This paper compares the
RSA Cryptosystem and Elgamal Cryptosystem implementations of mental poker card
games using distributed key generation schemes. Each implementation is based on
a joint encryption/decryption of individual cards. Both implementations use shared
private key encryption/decryption schemes and neither uses a trusted third party
(TTP). The comparison criteria will be concentrated on the security and computa-
tional complexity of the game, collusions among the players and the debate between
the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and the factoring problem (FP) for the encryp-
tion/decryption schemes. Under these criteria, the comparison results demonstrate
that the Elgamal Cryptosystem has better eciency and eectiveness than RSA for
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mental poker card games.
2.2 Problem Statement
Computer networks and especially the Internet have become very popular in daily
life over the past several years. This kind of remote luxury has allowed many on-
line activities such as e-shopping and e-gambling. The problem of mental poker is
directly related to e-gambling. One can dene this problem as how to play a fair
game of poker without the need for a trusted dealer [16]. Fairness can be described as
how one player can be sure that none of the players are peeking at the cards of other
players after the deck has been shued and the cards dealt. Accomplishing fairness
in the mental poker game in a non-physical environment becomes dicult in shuing
and dealing the cards. Mental poker has many advantages for players including being
time-independent as well as place-independent. When the desire to play is there, a
player can immediately go online to play. All one needs is a computer, an internet
connection and a valid credit card.
The main disadvantage of mental poker is the inability to establish the trust of
a player that the online game is being fairly and honestly conducted. In a physical
casino, players are able to see the actions taken by the dealer and other players during
the course of the game, so the fairness of the game can be observed. In the digital
world, this is not the case. In on-line casinos, without some kind of encryption key,
the card value can be obtained by third parties. Since online players are not able to
see the dealer shuing and dealing, the appearance of random fairness becomes most
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important.
In most on-line casinos, during shuing and dealing, TTPs are used to provide
non-manipulated random values for the cards. In this case, on-line casinos turn into
a privileged entity and the players can not verify the fairness of the cards. Random
card values can be jointly generated by the players using cryptographic protocols in
the absence of a TTP.
In this study, we will investigate two dierent cryptographic protocols. The rst
one is called the Elgamal Cryptosystem (EC) [5], which was dened by Tahir Elgamal
in 1984. The second cryptosystem is called the RSA Cryptosystem (RC) [16], which
was dened by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman in 1977. This thesis will
attempt to prove is that the Elgamal Cryptosystem is more ecient and secure than
RSA, thus a better t for the security requirements of on-line casinos.
2.3 The Signicance of The Proposed Problem
Existing cryptosystems have been subject to comparisons in the past. However,
in terms of eciency and security, there is a need to show the specic comparison
between EC and RC for mental poker. There is no research in this specic eld to
show the dierent aspects of these two cryptosystems when they are applied to mental
poker. Furthermore, this research will provide online casino owners/designers with
signicant security information to enhance and improve the security of their internet
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gambling site. The aim of this research is to show the comparisons between EC and
RC when they are applied to the mental poker.
2.4 Methods
We will concentrate on four dierent evaluation criteria. These are: the computational
burden of adding one more player to the on-line poker table, \security-per-bit" issues
for key material, multi-player collusions and the securities of computing logarithms. In
our study, the rst comparison criteria is chosen to show time eciency of adding one
more player to the mental poker game using two dierent cryptosystems. The second
comparison criteria shows the security levels of encryption and decryption key pairs
for both cryptosystems. The key strength is important for possible eavesdropping
attacks such as a player who wants to retrieve the card values of his/her opponents.
The third criteria is chosen to show collusion eects in a mental poker game using
Elgamal and RSA cryptosystems. In a mental poker game collusion can be dened as
secret player cooperation. Finally, the forth criteria focuses on the security aspects
of both cryptosystems in general.
2.5 Overview
2.5.1 Cryptosystems
In this section, we will give the descriptions of Elgamal and RSA cryptosystems.
The Elgamal Cryptosystem: In Elgamal key generation, each communicating party
should perform the following steps [14].
10
1. Elgamal Key Generation
(a) Generate a random prime p and a generator  of the multiplicative
group (Z=pZ).
(b) Select a random natural number a < p  1 and compute a(mod p).
(c) The public key is (p; ; a) and the private key a.
2. Elgamal Public-Key Cipher
If entity A wishes to send a message to entity B, then A must perform the
following steps in the enciphering stage.
(a) Obtain B's public-key (p; ; a).
(b) Convert the plaintext message into an integerm in the range f0; 1; : : : ; p 
1g.
(c) Choose a random natural number b < p  1.
(d) Compute   b(mod p) and   m(a)b(mod p).
(e) Send the ciphertext c = (; ) to B. Once B recieves c, then the
following is performed. This stage is called the deciphering stage.
i. Use the private key to compute p 1 (mod p).
ii. Decipher m by computing  a(mod p).
The deciphering stage is computed using below equation.
 a   abmab  m(mod p)
According to the scheme above all the parties should perform the same steps
to encrypt and decrypt the cards on the table .
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RSA Cryptosystem: We review this cryptosystem in two parts. In the part one of
two each entity should perform the following procedures [16].
1. Generate the two keys, choose two random large prime numbers, p and q.
For maximum security, p and q should be chosen of equal length.
2. Compute the product n = pq and ffi(n) = (p   1)(q   1). n is called the
RSA modulus.
3. Randomly choose the encryption key e where gcd(e; ffi(n)) = 1.
4. Use the Extended Euclidean Theorem to compute the decryption key such
that
ed = 1 mod (ffi(n)): (2.1)
A further computation is as follows:
d = e 1mod ffi(n): (2.2)
The numbers e as in Equation 2.1 and n are the public key; the number d
is the private key.
5. In the second part of the cryptosystem review to encrypt a message, m,
one should rst divide the message into numerical blocks smaller than n
12
and then use the encryption formula
c = me mod n: (2.3)
6. To decrypt a message each encrypted message block should be computed
with the formula below
m = cd mod n: (2.4)
2.5.2 Protocol
Games of mental poker require shuing and dealing the cards. The properties de-
sired of mental poker come from the properties of real poker games. Players cannot
inuence the shuing, nor learn anything about other players' cards which are dealt
face down. In our model protocol we assume that every randomly dealt card is drawn
from a set of the cards and adversaries do not know anything about others' cards.
With these properties of model protocol, players' trust is established and the fairness
of the game is assured.
We now give a detailed protocol overview for our implementations. We shue a
deck of cards using commutative cryptosystems (CC). Using CC eliminates a need
for a TTP in the mental poker game. A CC, using a commutative scheme, means
that if some data is encrypted more than once, the decryption order does not matter
[16]. EC and RC are commutative cryptosystem schemes. There are three earlier
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approaches for card shuing protocols. The rst approach is using a TTP . This is
a relied upon dealer that is used to fairly shue and deal the cards [10]. The main
disadvantages of this approach are the possible collusion of some of the players and
poorly shued cards [0]. Another approach is Creapau's algorithm for distributing
trust among the players. The main drawback is the tremendous computational bur-
den [6]. The last approach is a mix server that takes ciphertexts and corresponding
outputs [10]. This approach is also highly costly in terms of modular exponentiations.
In our threshold protocol schemes implementing RC and EC, players jointly generate
and share public and private keys using RSA and Elgamal cryptosystems' encryption
schemes.
Protocol Overview and Basics
Poker is played with a 4-suit 52 card deck. In our implementations, we assume that
the deck includes exactly 52 cards. We represent the cards in the deck with the set
of integers modulo 52, i.e. the set f0; 1; : : : ; 51g. Eciency is given a measure of
modular exponentiations and leads us to the computational cost. We will eliminate
the existence of an TTP in shuing and dealing the cards. In this research, we use
distributed key generation without relying on a trusted third party for both imple-
mentations and comparisons of the cryptosystems.
In our implementations card shuing and dealing is executed in the same step.
The cards are generated when they are needed. We skip the initial step of encrypt-
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ing all cards at once. This approach helps with the time eciency of our structure.
Players jointly encrypt E(c) of a card c 2 f1; 2; : : : 52g and then they compare the
ciphertext E(c) with all the encrypted cards that have been previously dealt from the
current deck. If a match is found, players try to generate another one until a match
is not found. Players also keep a list of encrypted cards that have been dealt from
the current deck [10]. In our protocol, encryption/decryption algorithms for E are
distributed among k players who are in the game and each encryption scheme E is
additively homomorphic. Given only the public-key and the encryption of m1 and
m2, one can compute the encryption of m1+m2. There is also a protocol that allows
the joint holders of the distributed key to check if a newly generated card has already
been dealt.
Additionally, players jointly generate the key material of the desired encryption
scheme. Each player receives the public key and their share of the private key. Key
generation only needs to be repeated if any of the players leave the game or if there is
a new player joining to game. Each player keeps the list of the encrypted cards that
have been dealt previously from the current deck [2].
Dealing a card using the basics stated above is executed as follows:
1. Each player ki chooses a card, ci  2 f1; 2; : : : 52g and generates the ciphertext
of that card, E(ci).
2. Each player ki reveals E(ci). If any of the commitments are incorrect, protocol
fails. In this case, honest players establish another session and repeat the needs
of the protocol again.
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3. Each player computes E(c). They use additive homomorphism property of our
protocol, i.e. E(m1) E(m2) = E(m1 +m2). This property helps to combine all
the honest players' ciphertext shares to generate the nal output of C, where
C =
Pk
i=1 ki.
4. The players keep a list of cards, L that have been already dealt from the current
deck. At the very beginning of the game, L is set to 0. For the fairness of the
game players must perform a test to determine if a card has already been dealth
from L. If there exists a card such that E(c) = E(c
0
) 2 L, then the players
discard that card and start generating another until the one is not found.
5. Each player updates L. Also, dealing a card to the ( ki )th player in the game
requires all the other players to partially decrypt their part of the ciphertext.
The resulting ciphertext is ONLY decrypted by the (ki)th player and only (ki)th
player can reveal the card value.
We now propose two implementations of mental poker for the above protocol. The
rst is based on RC and the second is based on EC.
2.5.3 Implementation of Mental Poker
RSA Implementation
We implement our protocol using a shared generation of RSA keys. Since the stan-
dard RSA scheme requires key generation in a single location, we do not use it for our
16
implementation. At the end of the computation, an RSA modulus is publicly known
and each player holds a share of the private key [1]. Once the players generate an
RSA modulus, as we recall from the denition of the cryptosystem, they can compute
the shares of the private key for a given encryption exponent [5]. Benolah's simple
algorithm for additive homomorphic structure of the private key generation is useful
to combine all the outputs of each player's share [5]. We gave an explanation for
this step in in the previous section at bullet 3. Each player computes ci and sends
them to the other players. Each player follows the below path for generating and
encrypting/decrypting a card:
1. RSA modulus is N = pq = (
P
pi)(
P
qi).
2. Players compute shares of private key d = e 1mod ffi(n).
3. Each player locally computes ffii =  pi   qi, ffiN =
P
ffii.
4. Players jointly determine the value of l = ffiNmod e using Benoloh's protocol.
His protocol uses additive homomorphisim. This means each player ki generates
an additive sharing of ffii =
P
j xi;jmod e. Then, they send xi;j's to all other
players, and each player locally computes
P
j =
P
j ffij = lmod e.
5. The above description of the distributed key generation allows distributed en-
cryption and decryption of the cards.
6. Each player encrypts a card using their share of private key. The resulting
ciphertext is E(ci).
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7. Each player decrypts E(ci) using equality c
d  cr Q cdi , where c is the
ciphertext of each card [6].
Elgamal Implementation
In this section, we propose an implementation of our protocol that is based on EC
encryption scheme [7].
1. Pedersen's protocol lets a number of players generate an Elgamal public/private
key pair in distributed fashion [16]. Pedersen's protocol is a distributed key
generation protocol that allows a set of players in the game to jointly generate
a pair of public and private keys in such a way that the public key is known to
all players while the private key is shared by n servers [16].
2. Each player learns a share of xi of the private key x such that
Pk
i=1 xi = xmod q.
3. To encrypt a card value C, let E(C) = (gr; Cyr) where r  (Z=pZ).
4. To decrypt a ciphertext (a,b), compute b=ax = C. Also, we know that when
the private is jointly generated among the k players, each player knows xi of
the private key x such that
Pk
i=1 xi = x mod q, where q is a prime from EC's
description.
Additionally, we also propose that the players play the game on an SSL secured
environment to ensure the authenticity and condentiality of connections.
18
Chapter 3
Model Implementation of
Comparison Criteria
In this section, we will discuss and compare the Elgamal and RSA cryptosystems in
four dierent evaluation criteria for mental poker.
3.1 Security-per-bit
Mental poker is very similar to a regular poker game with the exception that there
is no verbal communications and no physical cards used in the online setting. All
communication exchanges are made by the text messages among the players [9]. A
mental poker protocol scheme must guarantee the fairness of the card game. The
key pairs for encryption and decryption should be strong enough to resist cheating
attacks. According to Schneier: \ the security of a cryptosystem should rest in the
key...." We assume that an adversary has the details of the algorithm, but he/she still
has to retrieve the key pairs in order to get the card values. Cheating attacks target
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the key pairs that are used to encrypt the cards. Schneier also says that today's pub-
lic key algorithms are based on the diculty of factoring large numbers that are the
product of two large primes. These two large prime numbers are used to generate the
key pairs of the cryptosystems. Breaking these algorithms based on the cryptosystem
schemes involves trying to factor the large number.
In our research, we will use symmetric and public-key key pair comparisons that
have similar resistance to brute force attacks. A brute-force attack is trying every
possible key one by one and checking whether the resulting text is meaningful. This
attack is not the only known type to retrieve the card values [16]. However, it is
helpful for the symmetric and public-key comparisons used in our tables.
For the game of mental poker \Security-per-bit" (SPB) can be dened as a ratio
between the number of the operations necessary to identify a card and the number
of key bits. In an online casino, SPB is a tradeo between performance and security.
Archiving an acceptable performance, the encryption, decryption, signing and veri-
cation of the cards in a hand of poker should be as fast as possible. However, the keys
should be impervious to any kind of attacks to decrease the probability of cheating.
In an online casino, dealing and shuing cards are rapid and there are no delays
relating to counting chips for a split pot. It is not uncommon for an online poker
table to average sixteen to twenty hands per hour. However, the number of players
and the type of the game are parameters that inuence the performance of the game
in terms of time requirements per hand. In this paper, we will assume that each poker
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hand takes between six and eight minutes including dealing and shuing, regardless
of type of game and number of the players. This approximation partially answers
how much time we need to insure the security of the cards per hand. We propose
that one session of poker game needs to stay secure up to eight minutes.
SPB of RSA Cryptosystem : RSA gets its security from the diculty of factoring
large numbers [18]. A list of sample key conversions between RSA key lengths
and symmetric key lengths is given in the Table (3.1). This table compares the
equivalent security level for commonly known RSA key sizes.
Symmetric Key Length Time Only Equivalent RSA Key Size
56 bits 512 bits
80 bits 1024 bits
112 bits 2048 bits
128 bits 3072 bits
192 bits 7680 bits
256 bits 15360 bits
Table 3.1: Symmetric and RSA Key Length Equivalents Assuming that Time is
Binding Constraint in order to break RSA Keys.
According to Schneier, the eciency of computing equipment divided by price
doubles every 18 months and increases by factor of ten every ve years [18].
Table (3.2) shows the security requirements for dierent information. Minimum
key length is given in symmetric lengths numbers.
Using the Tables 3.1 and 3.2, we can understand why the key size is important in
terms of security and performance. By keeping the cards secure during the life
of a poker hand, all the players are insured that underlying keys are sucient
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Type of Trac Lifetime Minimum Key Length
Tactical military information minutes/hours 56-64 bits
Product announcements, mergers, interest rates days/weeks 64 bits
Long term business plans years 64 bits
Trade secrets(e.g., recipe for Coca-Cola) decades 112 bits
H-bomb secrets > 40 years 128 bits
Identities of spies > 50 years 128 bits
Personel aairs > 50 years 128 bits
Diplomatic embarrassments > 65 years at least 128 bits
U.S. census data > 100 years at least 128 bits
Table 3.2: Security Requirements for Dierent Information.
enough to render the best possible cheating attack infeasible. This leads us to
the questions how long such keys will be secure as well as to what the key size
should be. If the lifetime of the data being protected is measured in only days
and/or weeks, there is no need to use a key that will take years to break to
retrieve the card data [18]. Since one hand of poker takes approximately eight
minutes, we have to choose our session key carefully for the performance and
security of one hand poker. As a basis of comparison, we will use data from the
break of RSA-512 key length. On August 22 1999, this eort required a total
of 8000 MIPS-Years, 35.7 CPU years to do the sieving, represented by about
300 PCs averaging 400 MHz and with at least 64 Mbytes of RAM, running for
2 months, and 10 days and 2.3 Gbytes of memory on a Cray C90 to solve the
matrix [27]. Using this data and remembering Moore's Law, processor speed
doubles every 18 months, we can drive the amount of time to break RSA-512
in 2007. It would take 1.8 months to break the same size of key. In our paper,
we propose that 512-bit RSA key size is adequate for an 8 minute session of
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one hand poker game. An example of an online casino Pokerstars.com conrms
on their internet site that their conguration uses RSA for authentication and
key generation. Currently, they are using 512-bit RSA key, which according to
Schneier is sucient for short and medium-term (up to several years) secrets.
SPB of Elgamal Cryptosystem Elgamal is a form of the Die-Hellman key ex-
change problem in Z which is at least as dicult as the problem of factoring [22].
Elgamal encryption gets its security from the diculty of discrete log problem
(DLP)[7]. The security is related to the diculty of deducting the private key
from the public key. This depends on the length of the public/private key pair
and the computing power that might be used to break the key pair to retrieve
the card value. In our research, we will show the strength of Elgamal keys in
terms of symmetric key length that will allow us to make comparisons between
SBP of Elgamal and RSA cryptosystems later in this chapter. We will use the
conversion chart between symmetric and asymmetric key lengths that is shown
in the Table(3.3) for comparisons.
Symetric Key Length Elgamal Prime Parameter p Elgamal parameter 
56 bits 512 bits 112 bits
80 bits 1024 bits 160 bits
112 bits 2048 bits 224 bits
128 bits 3072 bits 256 bits
192 bits 7680 bits 384 bits
256 bits 15360 bits 512 bits
Table 3.3: Symmetric and Elgamal Key Lengths with Similar Resistances to Brute-
Force Attacks.
The table 3.3 shows Elgamal public-key primary security parameter lengths
whose factoring diculty almost equals the diculty of a brute-force attack
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for symmetric key lengths. This table also shows that if one is choosing 56-bit
symmetric key length, equal security is provided by 512-bit Elgamal public-key
algorithm.
The best known attack on EC is solving the discrete logarithm problem. El-
gamal cryptosystem gets its security from the diculty of discrete logarithm
problem [18]. The discrete logarithm problem in a nite group G can be stated
as follows: compute x from g and u = gx. The integer x is called the discrete
logarithm of u in base g, x = logg(u) [8]. There are several algorithms to solve
this problem. Number eld sieve (NFS) is one of the best known solving al-
gorithm for DLP problem and based on integer factorization. Since DLP is a
hard problem [18], we study these algorithms by their asymptotic and practical
running time behaviors. The running time consequences are directly related to
the key sizes of the cryptosystems. It is very dicult to give an estimation of
the largest key size that can be solved by DLP algorithms.
Comparison of SPB for both Cryptosystems Analysis based on the best avail-
able algorithms for both factoring and discrete logarithms show that the RSA
system and the Elgamal system have similar security for equivalent key lengths
[20]. It is slightly harder to compute discrete logs modulo an appropriate prime
than to factor a hard integer of the same size - so RSA would appear slightly
weaker than DHP/Elgamal [20]. According to Schenier, \RSA users have to
choose a larger key size those using than DH/Elgamal over a nite eld for
equivalent security." Since we know that computing discrete logarithms is
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closely related to factoring, if one can solve discrete logarithm problem then
one can factor [18]. Similarly, if DH is broken by solving the DLP then RSA
can also be broken, since, if one knows how to take discrete logs, then one can
factor (that is the basis of Shor's quantum factoring algorithm [20]). Thus, DLP
would seem stronger than the factoring problem (FP), since factoring does not
allow one to solve discrete logs [20].
The largest known factorization for NFS factoring algorithm is 512-bit RSA
number [RSA]. This consequence gives an accurate gure of what can be ac-
complished in terms of factorization algorithms. The NFS algorithm for DLP
problem is more limited. According to Joux and Lercier, over a 120-digit prime
eld that corresponds to 397-bit length DLP/Elgamal key size [30].
Similarly, comparing the \largest breaks" of each key type, we see that an 512-
bit RSA key has been broken but only a 283-bit DH key has been broken [20].
The 512-bit RSA break used around 8,000-MIPS years and it has been predicted
that the task is equivalent to an Elgamal key in a prime eld with a characteristic
of 365-bits [20]. Additionally, Elgamal provides equivalent security with 365-
bit public-key whose factoring diculty is closely equal to the diculty of the
64-bit symmetric key. Thus, Elgamal has an equivalent security to RSA with a
shorter key length.
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3.2 Computational Burden
Computational cost is a function of operations that require time, space and software
power. These operations are shuing, dealing and adding more players to the game.
In this section we will evaluate computational cost of both cryptosystems for mental
poker.
Computational Cost of Using RSA cryptosystem for mental Poker
Existing protocols for distributed RSA-key generation allow three or more parties
to generate an RSA modulus N = pq such that all parties are convinced that N
is a product of two primes. However, none of them can factor N . These protocols
also show how the parties can generate shares of a private decryption exponent to
allow treshhold decryption. It is possible to test that N is a product of two primes.
K parties computes the shares of N in a private distributed computation where
N = pq = (
P
pi)(
P
qi) without revealing any information about the factors is possi-
ble.
Operation 512 bits 768 bits 1024 bits
Encrypt 0.03 sec 0.05 sec 0.08 sec
Decrypt 0.16 sec 0.48 sec 0.93 sec
Sign 0.16 sec 0.52 sec 0.97 sec
Verify 0.02 sec 0.07 sec 0.08 sec
Table 3.4: RSA Speeds for Dierent Modulus Lengths with an 8-bit public key (on a
SPARC II).
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Implementation of mental poker using RSA requires distributed key generation.
Private keys should not be shared. In RSA, while each person should have a unique
modulus and private exponent (that is, a unique private key), the public exponent
can be common to a group of users without security being compromised. Some public
exponents in common use today are 3 and 216+1; because these numbers are small,
the public key operations (encryption and signature verication) are fast relative to
the private key operations (decryption and signing). If one public exponent becomes
standard, software and hardware can be optimized for that value. However, the mod-
ulus should not be shared.
In a research study performed by [2] from Stanford University showed that generat-
ing a 1024-bit RSA key among the three 300Mhz Pentium machines took 90 seconds.
Total network trac was 1.16 MB. In another example of shared RSA key generation
in a mobile adhoc network, a WLAN of three computers for a 512-bit key, averaged
2.5 minutes.
Table(3.6) shows some results when running the system on three servers. This table
was constructed by the generation of the key in three dierent machines. This ta-
ble shows that when computing a 512-bit modulus, each thread spent an average of
55.7ms per iteration executing the BGW protocol. Experimentally, two threads per
machine is optimal for a 512-bit key and 6 threads per server is optimal for a 1024-bit
key.
This estimation was generated using 333MHz Pentium II and server were connected
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by a 10-Megabit Ethernet [2]. Estimation does not reect the time to generate a
sharing of private key d once the modulus is found since it is not signicant compared
to the rest of the study. However, for a 512-bit key, this time is given as 20ms. It is
also estimated that 512-bit key requires an average of 238 iterations per thread.
The consequences of the above studies can help us to understand and compare
time requirements of a mental poker game with more than two players. If there are
three players in the game, the RSA-key generation takes about 0.15 minutes and if
we add one more player to the game the overall key generation increases 2.19 minutes
to 3.70 minutes. Furthermore, if there are ve players in the game the time estima-
tion for the RSA-key generation increases 4.10 minutes to 5.61 minutes. If we think
about the time estimation of one hand of mental poker game, we need approximately
6-7 minutes to shue and deal the cards and nish the round. Thus, we can see
computational burden of adding more players to the poker game causes overall time
expansion.
Additionally, Table(3.6) shows the time estimations for distributed key generation
of RSA implementation for 1024-bit keys.
After the RSA key generation, each player receives the public parameters, public
key and a share of the private key. A new group establishment is needed if a player
leaves or a new player joins to the table.
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Key Length Total Net Number
Time(k) Trac of threads
512-bit 0.15 min 0.180 Mb 2
1024-bit 1.51 min 1.162 Mb 6
2048-bit 18.13 min 7.48 Mb 6
Table 3.5: Shared Key Generation Time Among Three Servers.
Number of Servers Time per iteration Total Time
per iteration(k)
3-server 695 1.51 min
4-server 1707 3.70 min
5-server 2589 5.61 min
Table 3.6: Shared Key Generation Time Among Multiple Servers.
Table(3.7) shows the computational cost of the protocol [12] for the stages after the
RSA key generation in terms of modular exponentiations per player. As we know,
modular exponentiations are one of the most important operations in public-key cryp-
tography. However, it takes time because the modular exponentiation deals with very
large operands as 512-bit integers such as RSA modulus. A modular exponentiation
is composed of repetition of modular multiplications.
Operation Cost
Deck setup 2
Test of Plaintext Equality 4k
Dealing a card 4kjLj=(1  jLj=52)
Table 3.7: Number Of the Modular Exponentiations Per Player for RSA.
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Computational Cost of Using Elgamal Cryptosystem for mental Poker
Elgamal cryptosystem oers distributed key generation just like RSA cryptosystem.
Pedersen's protocol [17] lets a number of the players generate an Elgamal pub-
lic/private key in a group-oriented fashion. Players precompute and store the values
of encrypted cards in the memory.
Similar to the RSA implementation, Table(3.8) shows the computational cost for
generating and dealing a card after the group establishment. This is given in modu-
lar exponentiations.
Operation Cost
Generating a card 2
Dealing a card face up/down 0
Recieving a card face up/down 2(k   1)
Reducing a card face down < 2(86 + 8k)
Testing for one collision 8k   1
Table 3.8: Number of the Modular Exponentiations Per Player for Dealing a Card
for Elgamal.
From Table(3.8) and Table(??), we can see the signicant dierence between card
dealing stages of both cryptosystems in terms of modular exponentiations for mental
poker. Table(3.7) gives us a conjecture running time as opposed to Table(3.8) where
the running time of modular exponentiations is almost equal to zero.
Modular exponentiations are very signicant part of public-key cryptography.
There are several algorithms to make exponentiations faster. In our research, we
will adopt the time estimations from a KAIST (Korea Advanced Institute of Science
and Technology) study. Table(3.9) shows the execution times of two algorithms that
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was implemented in the study of KAIST [31]. Operations were performed on a Pen-
tium 90 microprocessor PC.
Table(3.10) was constructed according to the study results of [12]. This table
shows the expected total real cost of a game with k players, measured in terms of the
number of exponentiations that each player must perform for Elgamal cryptosystem.
Algorithm 256-bit 512-bit 768-bit 1024-bit
Montgomery(WMM) 0.137 0.544 1.16 2.07
Proposed(WMM) 0.0604 0.220 0.489 0.868
Montgomery(MS) 0.121 0.445 0.917 1.65
Proposed(MS) 0.0851 0.297 0.698 1.22
Table 3.9: The Execution Time of Each Algorithm in msec.
Scheme Elgamal
Texas Hold'em(3-player)
Deck setup and 1st round 800
Additional rounds (Max) 660
Texas Hold'em(5-player)
Deck setup and 1st round 1700
Additional rounds (Max) 2900
Table 3.10: Expected Total Real Cost of a Game with k Players in Terms of Modular
Exponentiations.
Combining the results of two tables, Table(3.9) and Table(3.10), we can reach the
176 msec for approximately 800 modular exponentiations for 1024-bit key operations.
For a game of 3 players this number is calculated as 694.4 msec. For a game of 5
players, we reach 7378 msec. This shows that adding two more players to the poker
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table increases the computational cost 6684 msec per hand.
A
dding one or more players to a poker hand RSA implementation, even at the dis-
tributed key generation stage, adds signicantly to the computational time. For a
three-player hand, the time is estimated as 1.51 mins. When a fourth player joins the
game, the computational time increases 2.19 minutes. This number again increases
by 4.1 minutes if two additional players join the game.
Elgamal implementation provides a better computational time estimation. For a
game of 3 players, the time for key generation, deck setup and dealing a card is cal-
culated as 694.4 msec. For a game of 5 players, we reach 7378 msec. This shows
that adding two more players to the poker table increases the computational cost by
6684 msec per hand. Using these computational results, we can see that the Elgamal
implementation is by far the most ecient for mental poker.
3.3 Multi-player Collusions
Collusion is a form of cheating in which two or more players signal their holdings or
otherwise form a cheating partnership to the detriment of the other players at the
same table. [35]
In card games, colluding players exchange information in order to collectively win
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the game. Card exchange, knowledge of a opponent's cards without player's consent,
and shuing and dealing the deck for one's own benet, are the common forms of
collusion. In the real world poker, players can usually observe and discover such col-
lusion attempts.
However, a secret communication channel between the players of a coalition is
possible in mental poker. One player can contact another player in the group to
signal his/her holdings. A mental poker protocol should be designed to eliminate the
possibilities of such collusions.
The algorithms for implementation of mental poker we propose use the properties
of threshold cryptography. In threshold cryptography, the secret key is split into
shares and each share is given to each member in the group of players [3]. The secret
key is generated in a distributed manner and players jointly generate a random key
such that at the end of the process all honest players have a share of the secret key.
Collusion Eects of RSA Implementation for Mental Poker
There are several algorithms proposed for a fully distributed implementation of RSA
cryptosystem. Threshold RSA scheme requires n players to pick random k   bit
integers pi and qi to jointly generate the RSA modulus N on n dierent machines.
Shoup's threshold RSA scheme allows to jointly generate, encrypt and decrypt among
a set of players [17]. However, this scheme uses a TTP. The protocols implemented in
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[1] and [2] are more practical but does not allow players to eciently share RSA mod-
ulus with strong primes. Consequently, [1] is not robust against colluding cheaters.
Also, [12]'s work revisited the work of [5] and [6]. It is signicantly dicult to have
a fully distributed version of RSA cryptosystem. In the work of [12], the proof of ro-
bustness and safe primes for the RSA modulus is given. Robustness is a measurement
of damage caused by colluding players. The distributed RSA secret key generation
is robust enough to keep the honest players in the game even if there is any form of
collusion among the cheating players. Furthermore, colluding parties cannot prevent
honest players from encrypting and signing.
The study of [2] is bk 1
2
c private. It states if bk 1
2
c players share the information
they learn during the protocol, they won't be able to recover the factorization of
N or the private key d. Consequently, if there are 3 players involved in a mental
poker game, no single player has any information. Furthermore, we assume that the
communication between player i and j is secure. We also assume that one can not
eavesdrop on the communication. According to [2], a coalition of bk 1
2
c learns no
other information about the private shares.
Threshold generation of RSA keys may still allow a party to cheat during the protocol
[12]. Since the production of safe primes is dicult, one can factor the RSA modulus
N . Cheating might cause a non-RSA modulus to be incorrectly accepted. If a group
of t players out of original n players are able to cause a non-RSA modulus to be
incorrectly accepted, they can eliminate the n   t players from the game and they
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can collectively win the game. One other drawback of this protocol is that it requires
at least three servers to be involved. In this case the protocol is 1-private.
I
n our study, we use the features of Threshold Elgamal Cryptosystem (TEC). We also
know that Elgamal cryptosystem is a discrete-log based cryptosystem [10]. Several
schemes exist to implement TEC and Pedersen's protocol is one of these schemes.
However, it had some security aws [14,28,3]. Pedersen's protocol for distributed key
generation was revisited to solve the security aws [11,15]. Furthermore, [21]'s work
shows that n players can generate a distributed key as well as a signature even if there
are k dishonest players. These protocols are fully distributed and k secure, meaning
that n members can sign the cards even if there are k dishonest members. All these
protocols use the idea of generating one publicly known modulus N while the private
key is created and maintained by the EDT scheme [21].
Maximum collusion protection and security is provided with TEC against player
coalitions. The proof is given in [10]. Even if k players collude, they can only obtain
the cards of the players in the coalition but not a card from the any n   k players.
No coalition among the cheating group of players can aect the cards drawn by the
honest players or the cards that have not yet been drawn in the encrypted deck. The
security behind these consequences are proven in [21].
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Afully distributed version of TEC exists for a more secure and minimum collusion
structured n player Mental Poker. However, a fully distributed version of TRC is
more challenging and less collusion free [21].
In TEC case, it is easy to compute the inverses of mod q because q is publicly known.
With TRC, if we do not know the factorization of RSA modulus N , we can not reveal
the inverses of ffiNmod e unless we use special structures [21]. Consequently, TEC
can detect the colluding players without a need to use special structures that TRC
would require the establishment of the same level of security for the honest players.
Starting with the key generation protocol, TRC is assumed to be non-robust. We
assume that all the parties are honest in the game. If TRC is made robust, more
invocations are needed to detect the cheating players. The protocol is b t c 1
2
c private
[2]. Consequently, this approach is only good when both n and k are signicantly
small.
On the other hand, in TEC, robustness with respect to n   k coalition players is
inherited from key generation and decryption protocols [7]. Furthermore, TEC does
not require at least 3 players to use the protocol. It is good for any number or players.
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3.4 Securities of Computing Logarithms
T
he security of RC depends on the factoring problem and the absence chosen-ciphertext
attacks [14]. If an adversary can factor the RSA modulus n then one can compute
the private key pairs from the public key for every player in the game. The factoring
problem for RC is also a hard problem [26]. The factoring problem have an expected
exponential running time of O(e(ln n)
1=2
(ln ln n)1=2 (1 + O(1))) [17].
Chosen-ciphertext attacks are closely related to the factoring problem [3]. A malicious
player may be able to decrypt the ciphertext of a card value if he/she can obtain the
other players' encrypted card values. Rivest and Kaliski studied the chosen-ciphertext
attacks [28]. Prevention from the chosen-ciphertext attacks introduces the padding
schemes that reversibly transfers a plaintext before the encryption. OAEP (Opti-
mal Asymmetric Encryption Padding ) is a scheme that has been proven secure for
chosen-ciphertext attacks [28].
T
he discrete logarithm problem has been the basis for several public-key cryptosystems,
including the ElGamal system. The discrete logarithm is as follows: given an element
g in a nite group G and another element h 2 G nd an integer x such that gx = h.
The discrete logarithm problem shows the same relation to Elgamal cryptosystem as
factoring does to the RSA cryptosystem. According to [29], the problems of decrypt-
ing the private key from the public key and of factoring n are the same in terms of
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required computations. The task that can be done by someone who has intentions to
cheat is that of recovering the plaintext m from Equation 2.4. The adversary can use
the ciphertext c and the public information (n; e).
The discrete logarithm problem is also NP-hard and has an expected running
time. Discrete exponentiation within a group can be performed with O(log n) group
of operations by using the method of fast exponentiation; however, discrete logarithms
appear to be much harder to compute. Methods for computing logarithms require
exponential time with the O(
p
x). However, the security of ElGamal cryptosystem
partially equivalent to security of Decisional Die-Hellman (DDH) assumption. The
security of the Die-Hellman system depends on the assumption that it is easy to
raise a number to a certain power, but dicult to compute which power was used
given the number and outcome. This assumption is sometimes stronger than the
discrete log assumption [14].
T
he asymptotic behaviors of both cryptosystems demonstrated above are similar but
in practice RSA keys are more vulnerable compared to the Elgamal keys. [25]
It is harder to compute discrete logs modulo an appropriate prime than to factor
integer of the same size. Consequently, RSA would appear slightly weaker than Elga-
mal [25]. For an equivalent security, RSA users have to choose a larger key size than
those using than Elgamal [25].
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Additionally, if one can break Elgamal algorithm by solving the DLP, then one can
break RSA algorithm [25]. Thusly, Elgamal based on DLP is stronger than RSA
based on FP, since solving FP would not allow one to solve the DLP.
Another argument for using the Elgamal keys rather than the RSA keys would be the
autonomy of encryption and signature schemes. If any player in the game manages
to obtain the private key pairs of the other players, s/he can only retrieve the playing
card numbers and cannot forge signatures. However in RSA, this malicious party has
ability to forge signatures [5,23].
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Chapter 4
Discussion
There was no comparison results generated between RC and EC in the past for the
same visited comparison points and our approaches on the model has generated cer-
tain results. Furthermore, according to Sam Simpson [29], a researcher in this area,
either Elgamal or RSA are, in operation, signicantly less secure than the other, given
correct implementation and parameter selection.
In this research, we have given the descriptions of two public-key cryptosystems,
Elgamal and RSA cryptosystems, for mental poker. We applied them on the given
model to compare the usefulness and eectiveness of both cryptosystems. It is evi-
dent from our comparison study results that Elgamal cryptosystem has a better SBP
than the RSA cryptosystem. We also showed that the Elgamal cryptosystem has
less computational burden in terms of time and modular exponentiations when there
is a need to expand the number of the players in a hand of poker. Another useful
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result of this comparison study is exhibiting that Elgamal cryptosystem has a better
resistence to multi-player collusion attacks than the RSA cryptosystem. Additionally,
we showed the Elgamal cryptosystem based on the DLP has better security than the
RSA cryptosystem based on the FP. We therefore conclude that the Elgamal cryp-
tosystem is better than the RSA cryptosystem in the visited comparison points for
mental poker.
4.1 Future Work
Presently, the Elgamal Cryptosystem provides the best security for mental poker.
However, there are other cryptosystems being constructed to oer the same benets.
The Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) is considered the next generation of public-
key cryptography. According to Kaliski [24] from RSA Labs, ECC provides greater
strength, higher speed and smaller keys than established standard cryptosystems such
as RSA cryptosystem and cryptosystems based on the discrete logarithm problem,
including Die-Hellman Key Exchange and Elgamal cryptosystems.
Table(4.1) [24] gives key size equivalents assuming that 10 million dollars is avail-
able for computer hardware. It also assumes that ECC key sizes should be twice the
Symmetric Key sizes.
As we can conclude from 4.1, ECC keys provide equivalent security in smaller key
sizes than RSA and discrete logarithm based cryptosystem.
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Symmetric Key ECC key RSA key Time to Break Machines
56 112 430 less than 5 mins 105
80 160 760 600 months 4300
96 192 1020 3 million years 114
128 256 1620(1) 1016 yrs 16
Table 4.1: Cost Equivalent Key Sizes.
Additionally, further study might compare our model with ECC. For example, imple-
menting the model that explicitly incorporates the structure of ECC and comparing
the results with those from our model would provide more insight to successful mental
poker modeling strategies.
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